Manage KMS
Efficiently manage and safeguard WEKA system keys through strategic KMS configurations and best practices. Optimize security and operational resilience.
Last updated
Efficiently manage and safeguard WEKA system keys through strategic KMS configurations and best practices. Optimize security and operational resilience.
Last updated
When creating an encrypted filesystem in the WEKA system, a Key Management System (KMS) is essential for securely managing encryption keys. WEKA relies on the KMS to encrypt filesystem keys and decrypt them during system startup, using in-memory capabilities for ongoing data encryption and decryption.
The Snap-To-Object feature stores the encrypted filesystem key alongside the encrypted data when snapshots are taken. During snapshot promotion to a different filesystem or disaster recovery within the WEKA cluster, the KMS decrypts the filesystem key. Therefore, ensuring access to the same KMS configuration is crucial for these operations.
To enhance security, WEKA does not store any data that could reconstruct the KMS encryption keys. As a result, careful consideration of the following factors is required:
Disaster recovery strategy: Loss of the KMS configuration can result in the loss of encrypted data. A robust Disaster Recovery (DR) plan is essential in production environments.
High availability: The KMS must be available during system startup, filesystem creation, and key rotations. Ensuring high availability for the KMS is highly recommended.
KMS encryption options:
KMS encryption options:
Cluster encryption key: A single encryption key used as the master key for the entire WEKA cluster.
Per-filesystem encryption keys: Available exclusively with HashiCorp Vault, this option allows each filesystem to have its own encryption key, providing enhanced data isolation between tenants.
The KMS is the sole authority for decrypting WEKA filesystem keys. To ensure seamless operations and safeguard your data, adhere to the following best practices:
Disaster recovery setup: Establish a robust backup or replication mechanism for the KMS to minimize the risk of data loss.
High availability: Ensure that the KMS remains highly available, as the WEKA system identifies it through a single address. Downtime in KMS availability could disrupt critical operations.
KMS access: Ensure that all WEKA backend servers can access the KMS to maintain consistent encryption and decryption functionality.
KMS method verification: Familiarize yourself with the specific methods your KMS uses for key security, unsealing, and recovery. Different systems have distinct processes; for example, HashiCorp Vault can enable using a trusted service. Understanding these mechanisms is essential for efficient recovery and key management.
Snapshot backup: When using Snap-To-Object, ensure that encrypted filesystem keys are backed up to an object store. This provides an additional layer of protection in case the WEKA system configuration is compromised.
The diagram illustrates WEKA's cluster encryption process, which supports both HashiCorp Vault KMS and (Key Management Interoperability Protocol). Here, we focus on HashiCorp Vault KMS for key management.
The following steps outline the process for managing encryption keys across the WEKA cluster:
Initial setup: Each encrypted filesystem (FS) in the WEKA cluster requires a unique encryption key. FS keys are encrypted using a cluster key and stored securely in the configuration table. The KMS configuration table stores the namespace and key-identifier for streamlined key management and secure access to encryption keys within the WEKA cluster.
Encryption process: During normal operation, encrypted FS keys are stored in the configuration table. FS keys in-memory are used for real-time encryption/decryption. After a restart, encrypted FS keys are retrieved and decrypted using the cluster key.
Rewrap operation: The rewrap process involves decrypting the FS key, retrieving it, and then re-encrypting the FS key with a new version of the cluster key. This ensures that the FS keys remain protected with updated encryption, enhancing security based on KMS policies.
In multi-tenant environments, such as clusters providing POSIX or S3 services to multiple customers, strong data isolation is critical. Each tenant requires the ability to protect their data with unique, customer-controlled encryption keys. To address this, WEKA extends its KMS integration to support independent encryption keys per filesystem using HashiCorp Vault.
In multi-tenant setups, individual tenants require secure, isolated encryption keys. By assigning a unique key managed by the KMS to each filesystem, tenants can avoid sharing the cluster key, ensuring greater confidentiality.
Per-filesystem encryption keys: Each filesystem can be assigned an independent external encryption key, ensuring tenant data isolation.
Shared credentials option: Filesystems within the same namespace can share authentication credentials for key access.
Cluster-level authentication: Provides the option to use cluster authentication credentials if needed.
Role-based access: Supports role-based authentication for secure key access management.
The following diagram illustrates how the WEKA cluster is integrated with HashiCorp Vault to manage encryption keys per filesystem.
Administrators must configure multiple keys within the KMS, one for each filesystem. During the creation of a filesystem, specific parameters are required, including the namespace, KMS key identifier, role ID, and secret ID. This configuration ensures that the filesystem operates with its dedicated encryption key.
Filesystem keys can be updated when necessary, such as when transitioning from Key1 to Key2. Administrators also have the option to revert to the cluster key, which involves removing the individual filesystem keys and returning to the previous setup.
Rewrap KMS security key for a specific filesystem
Rewrap operations can be performed per filesystem, enabling each key to be re-encrypted with a new version if there are concerns about key compromise.
Related topics
For further guidance on securing HashiCorp Vault in production environments, refer to the documentation.
The weka fs create command supports this process. For details, see .
The weka fs update command supports these updates. For details, see .
The weka fs kms-rewrap command supports this operation. For details, see .
To create a filesystem from an uploaded snapshot originating from an encrypted source, use the weka fs download command. For details, see .
Before configuring per-filesystem encryption, you must first establish a connection between the WEKA cluster and the configured HashiCorp Vault KMS by setting up the key-identifier (Weka_cluster_key in the illustration above). Use the weka security kms set command to specify the role-id and secret-id for this connection. For details, see .
If there are concerns about key compromise, administrators can rewrap all filesystem keys using the weka security kms rewrap --all command.
When the --all option is omitted, the system rewraps only the filesystems that use the cluster encryption key. For details, see .
Supported KMS types:
: Supports protocol versions 1.2+ and 2.x. Only is supported as the messaging protocol.
: Supports versions 1.1.5 to 1.14.x.